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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This paper generalizes the critical loss concept of Harris and Simons to account for a broader range of possible cost structures. Our analysis presents a specialized market-level equilibrium for a relatively homogeneous good in which the Harris and Simons’ critical loss structure is appropriate for market definition. Then, we broaden the equilibrium and propose a generalized critical loss analysis. Of course, for relatively differentiated goods, market definition analysis would use firm-level modeling and therefore the standard market-level critical loss modeling could be inappropriate.

This research provides accounting-ethics authors and administrators with a benchmark for accounting-ethics research. While Bernardi and Bean (2010) considered publications in business-ethics and accounting’s top-40 journals this study considers research in eight accounting-ethics and public-interest journals, as well as, 34 business-ethics journals. We analyzed the contents of our 42 journals for the 25-year period between 1991 through 2015. This research documents the continued growth (Bernardi & Bean, 2007) of accounting-ethics research in both accounting-ethics and business-ethics journals. We provide data on the top-10 ethics authors in each doctoral year group, the top-50 ethics authors over the most recent 10, 20, and 25 years, and a distribution among ethics scholars for these periods. For the 25-year timeframe, our data indicate that only 665 (274) of the 5,125 accounting PhDs/DBAs (13.0% and 5.4% respectively) in Canada and the United States had authored or co-authored one (more than one) ethics article.

A major source of failure for new ventures is the entrepreneurs℉ misunderstanding of the product-market fit. Recently, researchers have suggested that to get a better understanding of the product-market fit, entrepreneurs should “get out of the building” and interview many customers. This approach, while advantageous, is not without drawbacks. This article presents a conceptual model that incorporates the characteristics of “getting out of the building” to conduct customer interviews, and the biases that can arise to influence the entrepreneurs℉ misjudgment of the product-market fit. We provide recommendations to overcome these biases.

This paper aims to examine the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on the academic business ethics literature with the intent of making this research more accessible to those researchers and practitioners working in business ethics and other related fields. Specifically, the authors outline the types and scope of SOX-related research, examine the extent of reliance on SOX, identify which theoretical frameworks and research approaches are used and point out under-researched areas.

Using a descriptive approach, the authors examine the theoretical perspectives, classifying these perspectives into four groupings (economics, ethics/moral, psychological and sociological). Using counts, categorization and content analyses, the authors provide an overview of 115 articles with further analysis provided for articles relying heavily (n = 14) or moderately (n = 42) on SOX.

Whistleblowing and codes of ethics are well-researched topics. However, employment of some theories (e.g. signaling theory and stakeholder theory) and qualitative approaches are used less often. Other under-researched issues in the sample include CEO/CFO certifications, cost of compliance, auditor disclosures and empirical investigation of SOX and auditor independence (or corporate culture).

The authors’ decision to use certain databases, search terms and research methods, and to focus on business ethics journals and English language articles are possible limitations.

The authors’ contributions comprise an examination of the scope of SOX topics and detailing how reliant the research is on SOX. The authors identify trends in this literature and provide evidence of the broad theoretical frameworks to better understand the breadth and depth of theories used.

Since the seminal contributions of Chandler and Williamson, a substantial body of research in industrial organization has examined the performance benefits of the organizational innovation of divisionalization. While existing empirical work has, for the most part, utilized a static framework to analyse the performance effects of divisionalization, adopts a dynamic approach, thereby allowing the intertemporal nature of any such performance benefits to be examined. Presents results from the UK manufacturing industry; the model estimated uses a spline function to incorporate differing organizational regimes over time. The results obtained are less supportive of the benefits of divisionalization than certain of the earlier empirical studies; thus the evidence presented lends no support to the view that organizational change provides unambiguous performance benefits for the firm.